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PRICE v. HALSTEAD - PASSENGERS HELD
CIVILLY LIABLE FOR AIDING AND
ABETTING AN INTOXICATED DRIVER
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a growing trend in the United States which holds
a third person accountable for the negligent acts of an intoxicated
driver., This trend has been catalyzed by activist groups such as
M.A.D.D.2 and S.A.D.D.3 Before this trend, in absence of a special
relationship between passenger and driver such as master-servant or
joint enterprise, a cause of action did not exist against a passenger
of an automobile when the driver acted negligently. 4 Price v.
Halstead5 exemplifies the expansiveness of drunk driving liability.
The Price decision recognizes a cause of action against the pas-
senger of an automobile when the passenger substantially assists or
encourages the driver in committing a tortious act.6 Therefore, a
passenger who substantially assists or encourages a driver to drive
while intoxicated will be held liable to persons injured by the driver's
negligence.
The holding of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in
Price transformed public opinion into judicial opinion. As one an-
alyzes the Price decision, one should be aware of the applicable law
and statutes which the court did not address. Additional theories
for holding the passenger liable for the acts of the intoxicated driver
are discussed later.
1. See Vance v. United States, 355 F.Supp. 756 (D. Alaska 1973) (cause of action against a
commercial vendor); Coulter v. Superior Court, - Cal. 3d -, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534
(1978) (cause of action against, social host who serves alcohol to intoxicated persons).
2. Mothers Against Drunk Driving.
3. Students Against Driving Drunk.
4. 7A AM. JuR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 635 (1980).
5. Price v. Halstead, 355 S.E.2d 380 (W. Va. 1987).
6. Id. at 389.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The factual scenario presented in this case is all too common
today. On November 24, 1983, Kenneth C. Wall was driving a pick-
up truck northbound 7 with Wall's wife and two minor children as
passengers in the vehicle.8 Stephen E. Garretson was driving his au-
tomobile in a southerly direction along with the defendants, pas-
sengers in the Garretson. vehicle. 9 Garretson and the defendant
passengers were consuming alcoholic beverages and smoking ma-
rijuana. 0 The defendant passengers were alleged to have been ac-
tively engaged in passing these substances to Garretson. 1 Garretson,
driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs, 2 was traveling at
an excessive rate of speed, lost control of his vehicle, and struck
Wall's truck head on while attempting to pass another southbound
vehicle. 13 As a result of the collision, Wall was killed, and his pas-
sengers received serious bodily injuries. 4 Consequently, Price, the
administrator of Wall's estate, brought this action against the pas-
sengers of the Garretson vehicle.'5
The court addressed the following four theories advanced by the
plaintiff: joint venture, joint enterprise, negligence of the passengers
for failing to remonstrate the driver, and substantial assistance or
encouragement on the part of the passengers. 6 Agreeing with the
lower tribunal, the court summarily dismissed the first three theories
advanced by the plaintiff. 17 However, the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia, recognizing the "Substantial Assistance or En-
7. Id. at 383.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. This violated W. VA. CODE § 17c-5-2 (1983).
13. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 383.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. The court summarily dismissed the joint venture, the joint enterprise and the negligence
theories advanced by the plaintiff.
[Vol. 90
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couragement" theory,18 reversed the circuit court's decision 19 and
remanded this case.2°
III. PRIOR LAw
At common law, the terms joint venture and joint enterprise were
sometimes used interchangeably. 21 However, these terms are separate
and distinct from one another. A joint venture is a business enter-
prise for profit,2 whereas a joint enterprise has no business motive
and is not necessarily for profit.23 Even though the two terms are
distinct, it is common for a claim to be brought alleging that the
passenger and driver were engaged in both a joint venture and a
joint enterprise.'4As a general rule, in the absence of a special re-
lationship, such as a joint enterprise or a joint venture, an occupant
of a motor vehicle other than the driver is not liable to a third
person for the negligence of the driver.Y However, when a joint
enterprise or joint venture exists, liability for the negligent acts of
the driver can be imputed to the passengers. 26 The critical element
in deciding whether the driver and passenger are engaged in a joint
enterprise is the right to control the vehicle.27 A joint enterprise is
not established by the mere fact that the driver and passenger were
riding together to the same destination for the same purpose where
the passenger had no voice in directing and controlling the operation
of the vehicle. 28 The critical element in deciding whether the driver
and passenger were engaged in a joint venture is whether the two
were involved in a business enterprise for profit. 29
18. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 386-89.
19. Id. at 383. (The circuit court dismissed the action holding that the complaint failed to state
a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure).
20. Id. at 389.
21. See Horchler v. Van Zandt, 120 W. Va. 452, 199 S.E. 65 (1938).
22. See Nesbitt v. Flaccus, 149 W. Va. 65, 73-74, 138 S.E.2d 859, 865 (1964).
23. See Stogdon v. Charleston Transit Co., 127 W. Va. 286, 292, 32 S.E.2d 276, 279 (1944).
24. See Price, 355 S.E.2d at 383.
25. See 7A Am. JuR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 635 (1980), RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)
OF TORTS §§ 314, 315 (1960).
26. 7A Ams. Jun. 2D Automobiles, Traffic § 634 (1980).
27. Stogdon, 127 W. Va. at 286, 32 S.E.2d at 276.
28. Frampton v. Consolidated Bus Lines, Inc., 134 W. Va. 815, 816, 62 S.E.2d 126, 132 (1950).
29. Nesbitt, 149 W. Va. at 65, 138 S.E.2d at 859.
1987]
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In the absence of a special relationship, the Restatement (Second)
of Torts holds a person liable for the negligent acts of another in
certain instances.30 Section 876(b) states that one is subject to liability
for harm resulting to a third person from tortious conduct of an-
other if he knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other.3 '
Section 876(b) expressly states that the other's conduct must con-
stitute a breach of duty.32 West Virginia Code section 17c-5-2 places
a duty on the driver of an automobile not to drive while intoxi-
cated.3 3 Therefore, an intoxicated driver breaches his duty under this
protective statute.
Moreover, the court has concluded that if one engages in affir-
mative conduct and thereafter realizes or should realize that such
conduct has created an unreasonable risk of harm to another, he
is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the threatened
harm.34 Robertson v. Lemaster35 afforded the court the opportunity
to hold a third party liable for the negligent act of another when
the third party created the risk of harm. In Robertson, the employer
was found negligent because he sent his employee home, some fifty
miles away, after the employee had worked for twenty-seven hours. 36
The employee caused an accident while he was driving home.37 The
employer was held liable, not on the respondeat superior doctrine,
but on the theory that he created an unreasonable risk of harm.38
IV. ANALYsis
At the beginning of his analysis, Justice Miller addressed Rule
12(b)(6) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, which re-
quires a complaint to state a cause of action.3 9 The court noted that
30. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1966).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. W. VA. CODE § 17c-5-2 (1983).
34. Robertson v. Lemaster, 301 S.E.2d 563 (W. Va. 1983).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 564-66.
38. Id. at 564.
39. See W. VA. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
[Vol. 90
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under a previous decision, a complaint should not be dismissed un-
less it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove a set
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. 40
By recognizing the plaintiff's substantial assistance or encourage-
ment theory, the court held that Price's complaint stated a cause
of action. 41
The court next addressed the question of whether, under the facts
of this case, the driver and passenger were engaged in a joint venture
or a joint enterprise. Justice Miller looked to the cases of Nesbitt
v. Flaccus42 and Stogdon v. Charleston Transit Co.43 for guidance.
In Nesbitt, the court stated that a joint venture was "an association
of two or more persons to carry out a single business enterprise for
profit...."44 Justice Miller examined the language of Nesbitt and
stated that "there are no allegations in the complaint which would
indicate that the occupants of the car were engaged in any type of
business enterprise. Thus, the trial court was correct in dismissing
this theory as a matter of law." ' 45
In Stogdon, the court held that a common right to control the
vehicle is a critical element in applying a joint enterprise theory to
the driver and passenger of a motor vehicle. 46 The Stogdon court
stated that "where there is no showing of a common right to control
the use of an automobile, an instruction to the jury that it may
return a verdict based upon the existence of a joint enterprise is
erroneous ."'47 Justice Miller recognized authority stating that a pas-
senger can be held liable for the negligent acts of his driver if they
were engaged in a joint enterprise. 48 However, Justice Miller did not
consider a passenger and driver to be engaged in a joint enterprise
where the passenger had no control over the vehicle and where the
occupants were traveling together merely for social or recreational
40. See McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1984).
41. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 389.
42. Nesbitt, 149 W. Va. at 65, 138 S.E.2d at 859.
43. Stogdon, 127 W. Va. at 286, 32 S.E.2d at 276.
44. Nesbitt, 149 W. Va. at 73-74, 138 S.E.2d at 865.
45. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 384.
46. Stogdon, 127 W. Va. at 286, 32 S.E.2d at 277.
47. Id.
48. See supra note 26.
1987]
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purposes. 49 Justice Miller stated that "something more is required
to invoke the doctrine [of joint enterprise] than an agreement to
travel to a particular destination for a common purpose. ' 50 Justice
Miller stated, "[I]t appears that the passenger and driver embarked
on a common purpose, that of drinking and joy-riding. This, how-
ever, would not be the type of endeavor that would give rise to a
joint enterprise." 5' The joint enterprise theory was then dismissed
as a matter of law.5 2
The court next analyzed the negligence theory advanced by the
plaintiff.5 3 It is an often stated premise that a guest passenger in a
motor vehicle may be guilty of contributory negligence if he fails
to exercise reasonable care for his own safety by way of remon-
strating the driver when the latter is driving in a negligent manner. 4
Justice Miller, discussing this premise, cited Herold v. Clendennen.5
The court in Herold stated, "Under the laws of this State, the driver
of an automobile owes to an invited guest reasonable care for his
safety; but the guest must exercise ordinary care for his own
safety.... "56 Justice Miller, relying on West Virginia case law,57
stated that the passenger of an automobile has a duty to exercise
reasonable care for his own safety.58 Recognizing this duty, Justice
Miller continued, "[tihis duty to exercise reasonable care for his
own safety cannot be converted into a general duty on the part of
a passenger to exercise reasonable care toward third parties. ' ' 9
Therefore, without this duty on the passenger to exercise reasonable
care toward third persons, the passenger is generally not liable for
the negligence of the driver in the absence of a special relationship
49. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 385.
50. Id. (citing Frampton v. Consolidated Bus Lines, Inc., 134 W. Va. 815, 62 S.E.2d 126 (1950)).
51. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 385.
52. Id.
53. The Negligence Theory states that the passengers were negligent for allowing the driver to
operate the car when they knew or should have known that the driver was intoxicated.
54. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 385.
55. Herold v. Clendennen, III W. Va. 121, 161 S.E. 21 (1931).
56. Id. at 121, 161 S.E. at 21.
57. See Hutchinson v. Mitchell, 143 W. Va. 290, 101 S.E.2d 73 (1957); Hurt v. Gwinn, 142
W. Va. 259, 95 S.E.2d 248 (1956); Herold, 111 W. Va. 121, 161 S.E. 21 (1931).
58. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 385.
59. Id.
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such as a joint enterprise or a joint venture. 60 Justice Miller, by
previously finding that there was not a joint enterprise or joint ven-
ture and that the duty on the passenger to exercise ordinary care
for his own safety could not be converted into a general duty toward
third persons, agreed with the lower tribunal's decision in dismissing
the claim under this negligence theory.61
Finally, the court turned to the most significant issue presented
in this case: whether a passenger can be held liable for the negligence
of his driver, in the absence of a special relationship, if the passenger
substantially assists or encourages the negligent conduct of the driver.
The court relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts62 for as-
sistance. Section 876(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states
that, "one is subject to liability if he knows that the other's conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or en-
couragement to the other as to conduct himself. '6 This theory is
sometimes termed aiding and abetting a tort and is by no means
novel. 64
In the court's analysis, the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
American Jurisprudence were examined.65 Moreover, the court relied
on Robertson v. Lemaster.6 In Robertson, the court concluded that
"one who engages in affirmative conduct, and thereafter realizes or
should realize that such conduct has created an unreasonable risk
of harm to another, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent the threatened harm.''67 In his analysis, Justice Miller stated
that, "the facts are even more egregious than in Robertson as the
passengers are alleged to have directly participated and to have en-
couraged the driver to continue to drink and smoke marijuana when
he was already visibly intoxicated." 68
60. 7A AM. JuR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 635 (1980).
61. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 386.
62. See supra note 28.
63. Id.
64. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 386.
65. See supra note 28 and 7A AM. JuR. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 635 (1980).
66. Robertson, 301 S.E.2d at 563.
67. Id. at 567.
68. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 387.
19871
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The driver of an automobile has a civil duty under the West
Virginia Code section 17c-5-2 not to drive while intoxicated. In the
present case, the driver allegedly breached a civil duty by driving
while intoxicated 9 and was encouraged to do so by the passengers.
Moreover, the passengers, by encouraging the driver to continue to
drink alcohol, smoke marijuana, and drive while intoxicated, created
an unreasonable risk of harm to another. 70
In its analysis, the court examined more than the case law or
written authority in this case. The court also analyzed the strong
public policy that has recently developed in the drunk driving area.
Justice Miller stated, "[flurthermore, if there is any area of social
policy on which there has been virtual unanimity of agreement be-
tween courts and legislatures it is the need to stem the tide of injuries
and deaths arising from driving under the influence of alcohol and
drugs." ' 71 The court's strong commitment to the reduction of ac-
cidents involving drunk driving has led to an expansion of tort law
in this field. 72 The case at hand emphasizes the court's commitment
to implement public policy and to "stem the tide of injuries and
deaths arising from driving under the influence of alcohol and
drugs." 73
The West Virginia Supreme Court has developed a rule stating
that a passenger will be held liable for the negligence of his driver
if:
(1) the driver was operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs
which proximately caused the accident resulting in the third party's injuries,
and
(2) the passenger's conduct substantially encouraged or assisted the driver's al-
cohol or drug impairment.7
69. W. VA. CODE § 17c-5-2 (1983).
70. Cf. Robertson, 301 S.E.2d at 563.
71. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 387.
72. See Walker v. Griffith, 262 F.Supp. 350 (W.D. Va. 1986) (cause of action against tavern
owner); Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985) (cause of action against social
host).
73. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 387.
74. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 389. See also West Virginia v. Bartlett, 355 S.E.2d 913 (W. Va. 1987)
(Causation is inferred once you show the driver was intoxicated, the vehicle was driven in a negligent
manner, and that the accident occurred).
[Vol. 90
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After reviewing the facts of the case and implementing the newly
developed rule, the court found that the plaintiff's allegations that
the passengers substantially assisted the driver in driving while in-
toxicated by passing him alcohol and marijuana stated a cause of
action.75 Consequently, the judgment of the circuit court was re-
versed and the case remanded. 76
The facts of this case enabled the court to apply section 876(b)
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. However, the court failed to
utilize existing legislation and law which clearly would have enabled
it to arrive at the same conclusion. For instance, the violation of
a West Virginia statute creates a cause of action.77 Furthermore, the
violation of a provision of the West Virginia motor vehicles statute
is prima facie evidence of negligence. 78 The passengers in this case
seemingly violated two West Virginia statutes. 79 West Virginia Code
section 60-6-9 states, in part, that a person shall not drink alcoholic
beverages in a motor vehicle on any highway, street or alley, or any
public garage.80 The driver and passengers were allegedly engaged
in the consumption of alcohol while they were traveling on a public
street. 81 Therefore, the driver and passengers violated section 60-6-
9. In addition, West Virginia Code section 60-6-16 provides "[a]
place where alcoholic liquor is ... given away, or furnished contrary
to law shall be deemed a common public nuisance." '82 The driver
and passengers furnished beer in an automobile while driving on a
public street, which is contrary to law. Therefore, by reading these
sections together, the driver and passengers violated section 60-6-
16.
The court also could have applied the conspiracy doctrine in this
case to create a cause of action against the passengers in the Gar-
retson vehicle. "A conspiracy is a combination of two or more per-
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See W. VA. CODE § 55-7-9 (1983).
78. Cf. Kretzer v. Moses Pontiac Sales, Inc., 157 W. Va. 600, 200 S.E.2d 275 (1978).
79. See W. VA. CODE §§ 60-6-9, 60-6-16 (1935).
80. W. VA. CODE § 60-6-9 (1935).
81. Price, 355 S.E.2d at 383.
82. W. VA. CODE § 60-6-16 (1935).
1987]
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sons by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose.... 18 3
As previously mentioned, West Virginia Code section 60-6-9 states
that the consumption of alcohol in a motor vehicle on a public
highway is unlawful. Furthermore, West Virginia Code section 60-
6-16 states:
If two or more persons conspire to maintain such common and public nuisance
. ..give away, or furnish alcoholic liquor in violation of any of the provisions
of this chapter, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object
of this conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor. 84
The driver and passengers were acting in concert if they all partic-
ipated in drinking alcohol while driving on a public highway. The
passengers, by furnishing beer to the driver, were carrying out an
unlawful act. Therefore, there was a conspiracy to drink alcohol on
a public highway, and the passengers, by furnishing beer to the
driver, performed an act that effected this conspiracy. Thus, the
passengers violated section 60-6-16. Also, all parties involved in the
conspiracy are accountable for injuries to third persons as a result
of the conspiracy.85
Alternatively, the court could have relied on section 876(c) of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 876(c) provides that,
"[flor harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct
of another, one is subject to liability if he ... gives substantial
assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his
own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to
the third person."' 86 The passengers, by furnishing the driver with
alcohol and drugs, clearly gave substantial assistance to the driver
in committing the tortious act, specifically, the fatal collision caused
by the negligence of the driver. West Virginia Code sections 60-6-
9 and 60-6-16 are statutes dealing with alcohol and intoxication.
Intoxication statutes serve as a protection against offenders who
endanger the well being of themselves or others. 87 In the present
83. Dixon v. American Indus. Leasing Co., 162 W. Va. 832, 253 S.E.2d 150 (1979).
84. W. VA. CODE § 60-6-16 (1935).
85. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 322-55 (5th ed.
1984).
86. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 876(c) (1966).
87. State v. Runner, 310 S.E.2d 481 (W. Va. 1983).
[Vol. 90
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case, the passenger's own conduct, by violating these West Virginia
Code sections, breached a duty to the third persons. Hence, section
876(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts could be applied in this
case.
IV. CONCLUSION
The holding in this case represents an expansion of tort law that
attempts to reduce the number of accidents caused by persons driv-
ing under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Drinking and driving
is not socially accepted, and the public concern is growing rapidly.
The public's outcry to reduce drunk driving has come to fruition
in this case. The court took this opportunity to convert public opin-
ion into judicial opinion.
The West Virginia Supreme Court, in deciding this case, ex-
panded Robertson v. Lemaster88 and seemed to follow the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts section 876(b). However, a cause of action
against the passengers could have been found on existing statutes.
West Virginia Code section 55-7-9 states that a cause of action arises
when a West Virginia statute is violated. West Virginia Code sections
60-6-9 and 60-6-16 were violated in this case. Furthermore, the court
could have applied a conspiracy theory against the passengers or
used the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876(c). The holding
in this case is not a radical evolution in the law. The court recognized
the theory of aiding and abetting a tort and applied it to the area
of drunk driving. With this decision, the court is simultaneously
attempting to decrease the number of accidents caused by intoxicated
drivers and increase the number of persons liable for those accidents.
Joseph J. John
88. Robertson, 301 S.E.2d at 563.
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